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The relationship between the military and political instability is often measured 
qualitatively, with emphasis on country specific cases. This paper differs from other papers on 
two fronts. First, the measurement of political instability as a combination of state failure and 
political violence allows for a more in-depth analysis than would be available if instability was 
examined as the onset of only one event. Second, by using panel data and maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) techniques, this paper is able to make general conclusions about the effect of 
the military on instability. The findings of this paper show that the various military 
characteristics are significant in affecting the probability of instability, with the most important 
















The onset of the Arab spring revolutions has once again shifted the spotlight on the 
instability of non-democratic regimes in the Middle East region, and now raises questions on the 
stability of other countries in the region. Furthermore, the recent overthrow of the Gaddafi 
regime, the civil war in Syria and the Egyptian military overthrow of the democratically elected 
government adds to the political uncertainty surrounding the region. Military intervention in 
domestic politics, while nonexistent for strong democracies, is still a reality for developing 
countries and struggling democracies. The question then becomes what is the military’s role, if 
any, with political instability. Understanding what political instability is and the role of the 
military in society is crucial in trying to understand the questions listed above. 
Political stability is to some extent an elusive concept to define, simply because it 
represents a host of events that lead up to the same conclusion. Several authors have taken 
different approaches to the concept. One such author argues that political behavior is “any act by 
any member of society that affects the distribution of the power to make decisions for that 
society” (Ake, 1975, p.271).  This means, any behaviour that maintains the power distribution 
structure of society is one that makes society politically stable i.e., obeying the laws of the land. 
Likewise the inverse of this definition of political stability can be applied towards the definition 





That being said, one cannot discuss political instability without examining the role of the 
military as either a facilitator or suppressor of instability and as one author puts it   “Military 
intervention is a product of two sets of forces-the capacity and propensity of the military to 
intervene and the conditions in the society in which it operates” (Finer (1988) cited in Henderson 
and Bellamy (2002)). The vast number of political actions creates a challenge in trying to 
measure the effects of the military on instability. Therefore the focus of this analysis will only be 
on state failures, attempted coups and successful coups; civil violence and civil war; ethnic 
violence and ethnic wars. This analysis will be divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction; the second chapter gives the reader a background on the literature surrounding 
definitions of instability and civil-military relationships while addressing the ways in which these 
concepts have been measured. The third chapter will review the data used in this analysis, the 
variables selected and the econometric methods applied. The fourth chapter discusses the results 
of the modeling technique used, and the fifth chapter summarizes the paper and addresses the 














As was stated in the previous section one of the biggest challenges involves accurately 
defining instability. To address the complex nature of instability, the work of political scientist 
Claude Ake’s (1975) provides a framework for understanding what this concept is. In it political 
instability is defined as any act that deviates from the regular flow of political exchanges which 
in turn represents the flow of transactions and communications among political actors. He also 
cautions against solely looking at political instability within the scope of specific political 
structures or political exchanges, because as he states “a form of behaviour that is destabilizing 
in relation to one political structure may well be stabilizing in relation to another” (Ake, 1975, p. 
274). For example, most people don’t necessarily consider elections as being a form of political 
instability, but if we look at an election in the context of an autocratic regime, then according to 
Ake’s definition, it becomes clear that elections are politically destabilizing. 
The works of Aisen & Veiga (2012), Jong-A-Pin (2008), Gurgul & Lach (2013), and 
Miljikovic & Rimal (2008) shed light on various ways to empirically measure political instability. 
For instance, in the analysis of growth and stability Aisen & Veiga (2012) look at instability 
from the perspective of a regime change via the number of cabinet changes experienced in a 
country for a given year. When they find that this measure is insufficient they create six alternate 
indices to account for instability by looking at three main categories: regime instability caused by 
external factors such as coups, within regime instability caused by internal factors such as 
legislative elections, and a violence index. 
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This is similar to the stance taken by Jong-A-Pin (2008) except that his analysis examines 
a much wider array of events, and he uses explanatory factor analysis to find commonalities 
amongst his events to build his definition of instability. In doing so he is able to measure 
instability across four dimensions: politically motivated violence, mass civil protest, instability 
within the regime and instability of the regime. Both authors find their results are most 
significant when instability is defined as: regime instability (caused by external factors such as 
coups) and within regime instability (caused by internal factors such as legislative elections). 
This suggests that events that cause a direct change in leadership are much better indicators of 
instability than those that do not in the context of their research. 
 Gurgul & Lach (2013) take a somewhat different approach in their analysis of instability 
and growth across central and eastern European countries and define instability as the number of 
government changes and the number of major government changes experienced, with major 
government changes representing a new political party in cabinet. While the differences between 
these two categories are vague their analysis showed that only major government changes were 
significant, corroborating the earlier findings of Aisen & Veiga (2012) and Jong-A-Pin (2008) of 
within regime instability as yielding statistically fruitful results.  
 That being said Miljkovic & Rimal (2008) put an interesting spin on the definition of 
political instability. They acknowledge that instability is more of a measure of uncertainty in a 
regime as opposed to a measure of regime failure, but they also contend that uncertainty is 
almost impossible to quantify, and therefore they define instability across three dimensions: 
irregular government changes (through unlawful and unconstitutional ways), regular government 
changes (election of a new political party), and if it is stable or unstable (defined as being a 
liberal democracy or dictatorship for at least 25 years).
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  By examining Ake’s (1975) definition and Miljkovic & Rimal (2008)’s earlier assertion 
of uncertainty, an argument can be made that time isn’t always the best indicator of stability. For 
example a regime might be a liberal democracy for 25 years and within that time period undergo 
multiple elections. However the mere act of having elections creates some amount of uncertainty 
because no one is ever 100% certain on the outcome of an election or the participants in the 
election. In that case simply looking at the length of time the regime remained ‘unchanged’ can 
be somewhat misleading.  
From the previous literature one finds that the constant theme through their definition is 
regime change, whether it is caused by friction within the government or outside the government. 
In most countries regardless of how deeply involved its military is in political affairs the military 
is still an external actor, and as an external actor they are unable to cause the type of internal 
regime change put forth by Aisen & Veiga (2012), Jong-A-Pin (2008), Gurgul & Lach (2013), 
and Miljikovic & Rimal (2008). This often means that any changes in the government that they 
require is done via coups. To examine this relationship Collier & Hoeffler (2007) test the effects 
of monetary incentives on the risk of a coup. Their analysis reveals that for high coup risk 
regions like Africa, the government responded by increasing military spending, while in low 
coup risk regions the government’s response was to cut military spending and reduce the size of 
the army. Their results also show that the behavior by African governments decreased the risk, 
while for the other regions there was no evidence supporting its effectiveness. This means that 
governments in this region sometimes try to buyout their own military to maintain their longevity. 
The relationship suggested by Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) findings differs from those done in an 
earlier study by Terrell (1971).
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 Instead of looking at military expenditure and the risk of a coup Terrell (1971), looks at 
political instability and the level of military effort. His work suggests that the relationship runs in 
the opposite direction with instability causing the military’s involvement. He finds that there is 
no relationship between instability and military expenditures but there is a negative relationship 
between military size and instability. He further comments that governments are reluctant or 
unable to increase the size of their military during times of instability.   
Other authors such as Tusalem (2013) and Adams (2010) have also tried to examine the 
relationship between the military and instability by looking at it from another different angle. 
Tusalem (2013) proceeds to examine the effects of military participation in politics on 
democratic stability and accountability and finds that states with politically active militaries are 
more likely to face lower levels of political accountability and thus less likely to aid in 
democratic stability, suggesting that in a consensus building atmosphere non democratic 
institutions are very detrimental. He also finds that military intervention as represented by coups 
decreases democratic accountability, and militaries with control over social policy, security, 
defence and officials in government post are more likely to weaken the strength of democratic 
institutions. Adams (2010) on the other hand examines the use of conscription as a way to 
stabilize democratic regimes. His results indicate that not only is there no relationship between 
conscription and democratic stability but there is a negative relationship between democratic 
consolidation and conscription, suggesting that as democracies age their use of conscription 
fades.  This further suggests that the military does not aid in promoting stability, at least when it 
comes to democracies. 
From the above literature one can see that the relationship between the military and 
regime stability do not always go hand in hand. Furthermore in situations where they do, the 
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relationship can be problematic for the regime seeing as it encourages a high level of political 
participation of the military, which in turn makes it likely to be the source of instability. Despite 
the arguments made by the other authors, this view is not held by everyone. Bah (2013) argues 
that military intervention in Guinean politics from 1984 to 2010 was beneficial in maintaining 
stability during that time period while her neighbours were undergoing periods of instability. He 
further argues that their adoption of an ethnic like mentality (us vs. them), towards other 
segments of the state allowed them to maintain cohesiveness and strength, preventing a 
downward spiral towards intra military killings and cycles of military inspired coups, thus 
allowing them to focus on furthering their status and economic self interest. 
Naturally the question arises, what causes the military to want to intervene? The works of 
Decalo (1989), Henderson & Bellamy (2002), Martini and Taylor (2011), Shah (2011) and 
Heiduk (2011) provides some clues as to why this is the case. For example, Henderson & 
Bellamy’s (2002) analysis of military intervention in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Papua 
New Guinea provides insights into the conditions required for intervention to occur. They argue 
that when militaries see themselves as being above the civilian regime they are more likely to 
intervene. This view is corroborated by Shah (2011) in his essay. He comments that in a 
developing country like Pakistan the lack of democratic constraints and feelings of superiority in 
the Pakistani military has made intervention a regular occurrence. 
Henderson & Bellamy (2002) further argue that another condition for intervention is the 
level of dependency between the regime and the military. Indeed when regimes are dependent on 




Martini and Taylor’s (2011) essay shows that in Egypt the level dependence between the 
military and the regime was quite strong. They state that since the early 50’s all rulers in the 
country have either come from the military or relied on it for support and in return the military 
elite enjoyed access to perks and privileges unavailable to the general populace (Martini & 
Taylor, 2011). This has the effect of insulating the regime from potential opponents and allowing 
it to remain relatively stable, a tactic regimes sometimes employ to maintain and strengthen its 
control over the military, by turning a powerful enemy into a powerful ally. This also turns out to 
be the case in Heiduk’s (2011) analysis of civil-military relations in three South East Asian 
countries. He also comments that as a consequence of increased political participation the 
primary role of the military is now the protection of regimes from internal opponents rather than 
external ones. This relationship isn’t always beneficial and as time showed the dependency 
between the military and a regime can be problematic, as was the case for Egypt. As Henderson 
& Bellamy (2002) put it “the greater the dependency, the greater the ease of further military 
intervention”. (Henderson & Bellamy, 2002, p.130). 
The complex nature of civil-military relations begs the question of how should civilian 
regimes proceed in maintaining control over their militaries? One view put forth is that by 
Huntington (1957) which states that civilian control can be strengthened by maximizing the level 
of professionalism within the military through the creation of an independent, and autonomous 
military sphere within government (Huntington (1957) cited in Heiduk 2011). Heiduk stresses 
one of the criticisms  levied against this view, which states that this approach can actually make 
the military less prone to subjection under civilian rule by amplifying the differences between the 
two (Heiduk 2011). 
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Decalo (1989) on the other hand argues that militaries with a more professional focus and 
militaries with ‘populist’ undertones are still prone to disrupt the current regime whenever they 
please. This suggests that the choice to intervene is not influenced by the level of professionalism 
or by a more communal mind set but rather by the factors given by Henderson & Bellamy (2002) 
That being said, other countries have also pursued various methods of maintaining their civil-
military relations. Decalo’s (1989) study on the stability of some African countries shows that 
they have been able to curtail the ambitions of their military through the following methods: The 
first involves preferential recruitment into the army, where having a military with members who 
share similar characteristics with the ruling regime limits their chance of intervention. The 
second method is the creation of a well paid, well equipped force-usually a paramilitary security 
force or presidential guard- to keep the military in check. The third method is to appoint family 
members into key positions in the military. The forth is the use of foreigners in the officer corps, 
because officers are assumed to be neutral. The fifth is the guarantee of external military support 
in case of domestic intervention. The sixth is by the regime maintaining its legitimacy through 












DATA ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
This analysis attempts to look at the relationship between political instability and various 
military characteristics. The dependent variables are: the occurrence of state failure, the 
occurrence of civil or ethnic violence, and the occurrence of civil or ethnic war, attempted coups 
and successful coups, all of which were obtained from the Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP) 
dataset. 
1
 For this analysis 17 years worth of data from 1991 to 2007 was examined for 115 
countries which gives 1944 observations.  
 For independent variables the aim was to try to account for conditions conducive to 
political instability.  In doing so the independent variables are split into several categories. The 
first category examines the military by measuring its behaviour and some characteristics. The 
first variable of interest is conscription.
2
 This is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 for 
each year in which the country had and enforced conscription and 0 during the years in which it 
is abolished, not practiced or never occurred. This data was obtained from War Resisters 
International’s website. This variable was included because conscription reveals a lot about the 
nature of the military in society. It can be said that in countries with conscription the military 
may often take on the additional role of ‘educating’ the general populace on how to become 
model citizens.  
 
                                                          
1 The data is available from the CSP website: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
2 Data for conscription was obtained via War Resisters International’s website: http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/index.html, 
Nation Masters: http://www.nationmaster.com/country/,  
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Next is military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the growth rate of military 
expenditure. More often than not defence budgets not only provide insights into the relationship 
between the military and the current regime, but also its technological capabilities. The data for 
military expenditure was obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) military expenditure dataset.
3
 Included is the growth rate in military expenditure. This is 
because the growth rate over time may yield insights as to whether the regime is anticipating or 
responding to an internal threat. Next is a measure of manpower by looking at military personnel 
as a percentage of the general population.
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The next variable included is past military regimes. This is measured by creating a binary 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if a country’s own military has either ruled or intervened in the 
country’s political process since its independence or date of last subjugation and 0 if otherwise.
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Since some countries have been independent since the 19
th
 century only military regimes that 
occurred in the 20
th
 century are counted.  Also if a country had experienced military rule in one 
year, all subsequent time periods receive a value of one. This is based on the assumption as a 
representation of the country’s history its effects linger long after the event has finished.  In some 
countries with military rule, the perpetrators may form some sort of ruling council or committee 
with their fellow conspirators, while in others a single individual emerges and claims the title of 
head of state. For the purpose of this analysis these two events are assumed to yield the same 
outcome of military rule.  
 
                                                          
3 SIPRI Military Expenditure data set can be obtained via: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
4 Military Personnel data was obtained from the correlates of war, nations capabilities dataset: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
5 This variable was created with data from the CIA world fact Book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-




Other events such as the country imposing martial law are not coded as military rule if 
the imposition is done by a civilian government and the civilian government retains control 
throughout the duration of the imposition.  For countries with multiple instances of military rule 
only the latest instance from date of independence is used. 
Diversity in the military is proxied via the fractionalization scores from Alesina et al. 
(2003). In it they calculate fractionalization across three dimensions: ethnicity, language, and 
religion. Since military diversity is often not observable or reported for data collection two 
assumptions are made. The first is the non exclusion in recruitment policies based on ethnicity, 
language & religion. The second assumption is that the military as an institution is a smaller 
version of society with the same composition but different rules. There is an important caveat to 
be made. Since Alesina et al. (2003) only measure diversity at a point in time there is a natural 
danger in assuming that these measures do not change over time. The authors address these 
issues and find that there are no drastic changes in their fractionalization scores within a 20-30 
year time period. Since the time span of this analysis falls within the 20-30 year range from the 
date the measures were calculated confidence in this variable as a proxy for diversity is 
maintained.  
The second category is with variables that look at economic growth. The first is the 
annual GDP per capita. This measures the relative well being of general populace. The next 
variable included is exports as a share of GDP to account for the effects of trade, followed by the 
GDP deflator as a measure of inflation. The use of the GDP deflator instead of the traditional 
CPI has more to do with convenience than theory; lack of consistency in CPI for the countries 




Lacking a suitable source for an unemployment rate the percentage of population 
employed is used as a replacement for unemployment. It should be noted that there will be some 
issues with accuracy associated with using this variable as a stand in for unemployment because 




The third category deals with the political system of the country. For this the polity IV 
scores based of the polity IV project were used. They measure the regime type on a scale of -10 
to +10, with +10 representing full democracy and -10 representing full autocracy. A variable 
looking at regime length is also included. This is done by looking at the number of years since 
the most recent regime change (Polity IV Project, 2013). It does this by looking at a three point 
change in a country’s polity score over a span of three years or less.
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The fourth category deals with health and population. This is accounted for by looking at 
the mortality rate for children under 5 for each country and the population growth rate to see if a 
higher population growth is more conducive to political instability by its interaction on the 
availability of resources. These variables were obtained from the World Bank website via the 
World Bank Development Indicators.  
The fifth category deals with regions and country age. The regions are split into seven 
groups (North America, South America, Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and Island Countries) 
and take on a value of 1 for if the country is in that region. There are several problems that arise 
when trying to gauge how old countries are. 
                                                          
6
 The variable for GDP per capita, % of population employed, and exports were obtained via the World Bank Development 
Indicators. 
7
 Data for polity scores were obtained via the Polity IV Dataset from: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
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Since countries are manmade they change rapidly as time progresses. In some cases 
groups of people living in an area are lumped together and called a country, in other cases the 
country in question might be the successor of a much larger ancient empire, or might have gone 
through many wars that changed and re-changed its boundaries. To avoid this problem this 
variable tries to capture how old the modern incarnation is. This is accomplished by taking either 
the country’s year of independence or its year of last subjugation as the beginning date.
8
  
This category also includes the addition of a landlocked binary variable, a Muslim 
majority binary variable and an oil exporter binary variable. These 3 variables are meant to 1) 
capture any of the unique characteristics of landlocked countries not accounted for by the region 
indicators and 2) account for further country specific differences imbedded in the region 




A table summarizing relevant statistics of the variables used in this study is presented 
below. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
Variables 
Magnitude of Civil 
Violence 
1944 0.0462963 0.2832 0 3 
 Magnitude of Civil 
War 
1944 0.2170782 0.914343 0 6 
 Magnitude of Ethnic 
Violence 
1944 0.1064815 0.464354 0 5 
 Magnitude of Ethnic 
War 
1944 0.3955761 1.296657 0 10 
 Magnitude of State 
Failure 
1944 0.0951646 0.537524 0 4 
 Attempted Coups 1944 0.0390947 0.19387 0 1 
 Successful Coups 1944 0.0102881 0.100933 0 1 
                                                          
8
 Measurement of the country’s age was obtained via, CIA world fact book, Wikipedia and Encyclopedia Britannica 
9
 Data for landlocked countries was created via the CIA world fact book 
10
 Data for Muslim majority was obtained from http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/  
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Conscription 1923 0.4888196 0.500005 0 1 
 Military Expenditure 1802 2.368979 2.031839 0 17.5 
 % of Pop. In Military 1920 1.680182 3.848013 0 38.27 
 Previous Military Rule 1944 0.4840535 0.499874 0 1 
 Ethnic Diversity 1938 0.4674306 0.263677 0.011928 0.930175 
 Religious Diversity 1944 0.4308182 0.238371 0.0034627 0.86026 
 Mortality Rate 1944 6.901024 6.55227 0.3 32.02 
 GDP per capita 1923 7319.059 12441.37 64.81015 106919.5 
 Exports as share of 
GDP 
1903 33.78643 21.4508 0.1829688 175.8974 
 Polity Score 1930 3.365285 6.37572 -10 10 
 Population Growth 1943 1.678693 1.475439 -7.6 17.31 
 % of Pop. Employed 1927 59.28677 11.66236 30.8 88.3 
 GDP Deflator 1930 68.12377 765.5635 -27.05 26762.02 
 
Methodology 
The argument can be made that trying to examine political instability as the onset of one 
event is too narrow. To account for the multidimensional nature of political instability it will be 
split into 4 cases. The first case which is the narrowest looks at the onset of state failure. This 
variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 in years in which a state failure occurred 
and 0 otherwise. The second case which is much broader looks at the onset of a state failure and 
the onset of civil violence or ethnic violence. The third case looks at the onset of a state failure 
and the onset of civil war or ethnic war. The fourth case looks at the onset of a state failure and 
an attempted coups and successful coups  
The multifaceted nature of political instability requires measurement techniques that 
differ from standard OLS for the cases presented. Since the dependent variable in each case only 
has two outcomes maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) via the logit regression is used. The 




        
          
                                         (1) 
Where xβ represents the sum of the regression variables and their coefficients. This form can be 
generalized into a linear format for ease of understanding: 
                                                            (2) 
The dependent variable      is a binary is the probability of the event for country i at time 
t. The variable      represents military characteristic given by presence of conscription, military 
expenditures, percent of the population in the military, previous military rule, the growth in 
military expenditure, ethnic and religious diversity of the military for country I at time t. The 
variable     represents a host of control variables,     represents dummy variables controlling for 
time and      is the error term.  The original variable that looks at state failure, ethnic violence, 
civil violence, civil war and ethnic war actually measures the magnitude of each event in that 
given year. Some may then ask why the use maximum likelihood estimation was preferred 
instead of OLS. There were several reasons for this. The first as was stated above was to try and 
account for the multidimensional nature of political instability and this is accomplished by 
looking at the probability of several events occurring. Secondly, the distribution of outcomes in 
the violence and war measures were neither normal nor continuous within the given range of 
values. Finally an analysis of the variables showed they only measured magnitude. Meaning that 
the number of values each event can take is very limited; between 0-4 for state failure and 0-10 
for the war and violence measures. 
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To circumvent this issue these variables were converted into a binary format. Since the 
method of analysis is via MLE the interpretation of coefficient estimates can be tricky, therefore 
to find the effects each variable has on the probability of instability the marginal effect of each 
variable will need to be examined.  
Seeing this analysis involves panel data there are several issues that need to be addressed 
so as to maintain the validity of the estimates. The first of which is to account for fixed effects. 
Fixed effects is appropriate if the assumption that there are unobserved characteristics within 
each country that may or may not explain the occurrence of state failure is made. From this 
definition fixed effects becomes the method of choice.  
To perform the fixed effect method the least squared dummy variable approach (LSDV) 
is employed. This involves creating dummy variables to control for each year in the observation. 
Due to the rare occurrence these events amongst the countries used in this sample, trying to 
perform fixed effects with country dummies proves to be ineffective. This isn’t all that surprising 
considering the fact that most of the countries have zero’s for the events in question thus making 
any variations between the countries that do have positive values for the events relatively small. 
Another issue to address is one of heteroskedasticity. This is problematic because if the 
underlying assumption of a constant variation in the error term does not hold then this could lead 
to inconsistent and biased estimates. To correct for this heteroskedastic robust standard errors 








The results of the regression analysis for case A and B are presented in Table 2. To avoid 
multicollinearity the growth of military expenditure was dropped from the regression analysis. 
The first section looks at the results for case A and it shows a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with conscription, expenditure, previous military rule, ethnic diversity and religious 
diversity. The estimated marginal effects predict that every year a country has conscription the 
probability of a state failure is expected to increase by 60.9%. This result is somewhat surprising, 
however conscription during non war time situation is associated with a less efficient army and 
losses to the economy (Adam, 2010), which in turn could be a signal for an already brewing 
instability.   Increasing the share of military expenditure by 1 standard deviation also increases 
the probability of state failure by almost 15%. If the share of military expenditure increases at the 
cost of other essential domestic services, like funding for the police force or funding for essential 
economic programs, then the lack of these programs could create the conditions necessary for 
state failure to occur. The results also show that probability of state failure increased by almost 
74% if the country had a military regime in the past. This result military intervention in the 
political arena is destabilizing and makes future regimes vulnerable to instability.  Militaries that 
are more diverse along ethnic and religious lines are also predicted to increase the probability of 
state failure, with a change of one standard deviation expected to increase the probability of state 
failure by 1.2 and 1.24% respectively.
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If one accepts that state failures only occur when “there [are] shut-downs of routine 
government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government 
directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with rival militias, warlords, or 
local or regional authorities attempting to establish autonomous zones of government” (Marshall 
et. al, 2013) then it’s easy to see that these events are likely to occur when large scale conflicts 
like ethnic wars and sectarian violence take place. Furthermore there is no guarantee that the 
military is immune or remains neutral during for they may also be participants or instigators in 
such an event.  
Table 2: Logit regression for Case A & B 
  Case A     Case B  










Conscription 0.6202769** 0 60.93   1.056136*** 0 98.49 
Military 
Expenditure % of 
GDP 
0.1510108*** 0.047864 14.88   0.272605*** 0.047864 26.28 
% of Population in 
Military 
0.047023 0.087819 4.63   -0.3450373*** 0.087819 -33.27 
Previous Military 
Regime 
0.754177** 0 73.90   0.27572 0 26.31 
Ethnic Diversity 2.026884** 0.00599 1.20   1.653001*** 0.00599 0.95 
Religious Diversity 2.332165** 0.005406 1.24   -0.18977 0.005406 -0.09 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  
The next section of Table 2 re-examines the previous military characteristics under the 
probability of a state failure and civil violence or ethnic violence. Once again conscription is 
shown to with the probability of the event, increasing the likelihood by 98.5%. This could be the 
case if there was mass disapproval of the countries conscription policy, which in turn could lead 
protests and rioting across the country. This specification also predicts that military expenditure 
is significant and a 1 standard deviation change leads to a 26.2% increase in the probability of 
the event occurring.  
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The result also shows increasing the percentage of the population in the military by one 
percent will decrease the probability of state failure, civil violence and ethnic violence by 33%. 
This result is somewhat similar to the findings of Terrell (1971) where he finds a negative 
relationship between military personnel as a percent of the population and political instability, 
and comments that, the negative relationship between manpower allocations and political 
instability results from the inability or reluctance of regimes to increase size during times of civil 
disorder. The negative relationship between the two variables could also be because a larger 
military size acts as an indicator of resources the regime possesses, deterring would be instigators of 
internal violence.  
 Table 3: Logit regression for Case C & D 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Table 3 shows the results for case C and D. The results from the first section, which 
examines the probability of state failure and civil and ethnic wars, are similar to those from case 
A with the exception of the direction of conscription and religion.  Countries with conscription 
see a reduction of 84.75% in the probability of state failure and internal war, while increasing the 
share of military expenditure increases the probability of instability by almost 14%. 
  Case C     Case D  












0 -84.75   -0.2898 0 -28.35 
Military 
Expenditure % of 
GDP 
0.1388097*** 0.047864 13.68   0.021999 0.047864 2.17 
% of Population in 
Military 
-0.06016 0.087819 -5.92   0.0660924* 0.087819 6.51 
Previous Military 
Regime 
0.443387** 0 38.15   1.511712** 0 143.39 
Ethnic Diversity 0.442669 0.00599 0.26   1.01937 0.00599 0.60 
Religious Diversity -1.91581*** 0.005406 -1.02   -0.34716 0.005406 -0.18 
21 
 
There are two reasons for this with the first being size. Size acts as a deterrent to 
domestic threat because the vast reserves of combatants shows the availability of resources that 
could lead to an unfavourable and prolonged conflict. Second is anticipation. The relationship 
between military expenditure and instability could be due to the government ramping up 
expenditures to in anticipation of potential conflict.  
Previous military rule is shown to be significant in determining instability, once again 
due to its potentially destabilizing nature as it paves the way for more competitors to use any 
means necessary to challenge its legitimacy. Here religion is significant in decreasing the 
probability of instability, specifically increasing the level of religious diversity in the military by 
one standard deviation leads to a 1% decrease in the probability of instability. The insignificance 
of ethnicity and significant and negative relationship of religion are similar to the findings of 
Fearon & Laitin (2003) where they found that ethnicity and religious diversity did not make a 
country more prone to civil war. 
 
The next section of Table 3 lists the result for case D. In this specification the only 
variables that are significant in predicting the onset of state failure and coups are military size 
and previous military rule. This result corresponds with the analysis of Henderson & Bellamy 
(2002) where they argue that if the military has been in power before then it is more likely to 
intervene again via coups. This appears to be the case as the probability of instability increases 
by 143% if the country had undergone previous military rule. Increasing the size of the military 
also increases the probability of instability by 6%. This is also because larger militaries mean a 




The variables country age and regime length were dropped to avoid issues with the time 
dummy variables. Table 4 lists the results of the robustness checks performed for Case A and 
Case B. The results show that when health, economic, political, regional, and various other 
country characteristics are included the only military characteristic that is significant is previous 
military rule which increases the probability of state failure by 98% suggesting that the military 
is a very big indicator on the likelihood of state failure. The result also shows several other 
variables of noticeable significance. The first is that a one percent increase in the mortality 
increases the probability of state failure by 31%. This is expected because a high mortality rate is 
associated with worse health, which in turn speaks about the effectiveness of the government on 
meeting basic needs of its citizens. The second is that growth in income decreases the probability 
of state failure, while a one percent growth in inflation leads to a .2% increase in the probability. 
This suggests that state failure is a phenomenon affecting underdeveloped countries. The third is 
that countries with a large Muslim population are less likely to have state failure (-262%), 
suggesting that state failure does not occur along religious backgrounds. The fourth is that oil 
exporting countries are more likely to have state failure. Countries where oil exports makes up a 
large percentage of their income are in danger because this income is very volatile, with a 
decrease in world price having drastic domestic consequences. The sensitivity analysis from the 
first case has shown that when the model is expanded to control for various other characteristics, 







Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for Case A and Case B 
  Case A    Case B  
 Coefficient Std.Err Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Std.Err Marginal 
Effect 
Conscription 0.440322 0 44.0  2.114425*** 0 211.3 
Military 
Expenditure  
-0.04603 0.047864 -4.6  0.4101551*** 0.047864 40.8 
% of Population 
in Military 
0.062613 0.087819 6.3  -0.3915953*** 0.087819 -38.9 
Previous Military 
Regime 
0.9890871** 0 98.8  0.5214469** 0 52.1 
Ethnic Diversity -1.44545 0.00599 -0.9  1.066686 0.00599 0.6 
Religious 
Diversity 
0.037775 0.005406 0.0  -1.019652* 0.005406 -0.5 
Mortality Rate 0.3140741*** 0.148609 31.4  0.1039143** 0.148609 10.3 
Growth in GDP 
Per Capita 
-0.1053711*** 0.136794 -10.5  0.04047 0.136794 4.0 
Exports as % of 
GDP 
-0.0207115* 0.491727 -2.1  -0.0335139*** 0.491727 -3.3 
Regime Type -0.1212929** 0.145128 -12.1  0.013117 0.145128 1.3 
Population 
Growth 
-0.1900219* 0.033472 -19.0  -0.2184848** 0.033472 -21.7 
% of Population 
Employed 
-0.02052 0.265672 -2.1  -0.1101708*** 0.265672 -10.9 
Growth in GDP 
Deflator 
0.0016247*** 17.42619 0.2  0.0010091** 17.42619 0.1 
Muslim Majority -2.626168*** 0 -
262.5 
 -2.827351*** 0 -282.6 
Oil Exporter 1.4753** 0 147.5  1.702754*** 0 170.2 
Landlocked -0.05861 0 -5.9  1.255074*** 0 125.4 
North America -1.16393 0 -
116.3 
 2.321121** 0 232.1 
South America -0.35352 0 -35.3  -0.9088 0 -90.8 
Africa -0.34531 0 -34.5  3.487229*** 0 347.8 
Middle East 2.018937 0 201.8  2.723055*** 0 272.1 
Asia 0.638854 0 63.9  5.003766*** 0 500.1 
 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
The next section of Table 4 lists the sensitivity analysis for case B. The results show that 
most of the variables from the restricted model are still significant and maintain their direction, 
with the exception of ethnicity which loses significance and religion with gains significance. The 
inclusion of other variables now increases the magnitudes of the military characteristics so now a 
one percent change in military size decreases the probability by 39%. 
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Countries that have conscription experienced a 211% increase in the probability of 
instability while a one standard deviation change in religious diversity reduces the probability by 
0.5% once again suggesting that more religiously diverse militaries are less likely to cause state 
failure. The estimates for the health and economic variables maintain their direction and 
significance with exports and employment reducing the probability by 3% and 10% respectively, 
once again suggesting that favourable economic conditions help prevent state failure and internal 
violence. We also find that countries with a Muslim majority decrease the probability of state 
failure and internal violence by 282% while oil exporting countries increase the probability by 
170%. This can be attributed to the fact that Muslim societies tend to be somewhat socially 
restricted than their non Muslim counterparts. Oftentimes the regime in these countries enacts 
laws or adopts stances that affect the ways in which individuals interact. This leads to big 
differences between Muslim countries and non Muslim countries on what are socially accepted 
behaviours. Also for countries with dependency on oil exports the distribution of the gains is not 
always equal. Sometime some groups are marginalised when the oil is extracted from their 
region, leading to resentment, protests and violent behaviour towards the government or the 
extraction companies. The results from the analysis also show that all the regions, except South 
America significant in increasing the probability of instability. With an increase of 232% for 
North America, 347% for Africa, 272% for the Middle East and 500% for Asia. The Large effect 
of   these region variables is most likely due to the inclusion of certain countries within these 
regions. Further examination shows that when these countries (i.e., Mexico for North America or 
India for Asia) are excluded the sign, significance, and magnitude of the regions either changes, 
or becomes insignificant. This leads to the conclusion that the region variable is a poor indicator 
of country diversity within a region.
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Table 5 includes the robustness check for case C and D.  The results show that the 
direction and overall significance of the original variables remains unchanged with the exception 
of a decrease in the marginal effect of conscription. However ethnic diversity is now significant 
with a one standard deviation change leading to a 0.9% increase in the probability of state failure 
and ethnic war. This suggests that militaries that are more ethnically diverse are not exempt from 
conflict along ethnic lines. Once again the results also show that favourable economic policies 
lead to a decrease in the probability by 2.9% and 3% respectively. Again we see that countries 
with a major Muslim population are less likely to have state failure and internal war, decreasing 
the probability by 139.7% while Oil exporters decrease the probability of state failure and 
internal war by 141%. An explanation for this could be that countries with if a civil war or ethnic 
war to occur, a drop in production could occur seeing as the opposition will try to cut off the 
flow of income into the country by destroying or disrupting production. Secondly the regime also 
risks losing control of a valuable asset as both sides try to control the main source of income. 
This makes the cost of a state failure and internal war high for these countries. The result also 
suggests that landlocked countries decrease the probability of a state failure. Once again we see 
that the region variables are significant with the South America Region decreasing the 
probability of state failure and as was stated earlier this is due to country variations not properly 
captured by the region variable.  
The next section of the table lists the results for case D. The result shows that when 
health, economic, political, country characteristics, and regional variables are accounted for, 
military size and previous military regime are the only military variables that still maintain their 
significance. The results also show that the mortality rate and inflation increase the probability of 
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state failure and coups by 15% and 1% while countries that are more democratic reduce the 
probability by 21.7%.  
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for Case C and Case D 
  Case C    Case D  
 Coefficient Std.Err Marginal  
Effect 
Coefficient Std.Err Marginal 
Effect 
Conscription -0.4383802** 0 -43.8  -0.15793 0 -15.8 
Military 
Expenditure  
0.3018914*** 0.047864 28.7  -0.2689 0.047864 -26.8 
% of Population in 
Military 
-0.01322 0.087819 -1.3  0.1066143** 0.087819 10.6 
Previous Military 
Regime 
0.4537336** 0 45.3  1.693007** 0 169.1 
Ethnic Diversity 1.553267*** 0.00599 0.9  -1.06066 0.00599 -0.6 
Religious Diversity -2.615848*** 0.005406 -1.3  -1.43499 0.005406 -0.8 
Mortality Rate 0.032175 0.148609 3.1  0.1522816* 0.148609 15.2 
Growth in GDP Per 
Capita 
0.017235 0.136794 1.6  -0.0853 0.136794 -8.5 
Exports as % of 
GDP 
-0.0307266*** 0.491727 -2.9  -0.01179 0.491727 -1.2 
Regime Type -0.02142 0.145128 -2.0  -0.2177475** 0.145128 -21.7 
Population Growth -0.15826 0.033472 -15.0  -0.0648 0.033472 -6.5 
% of Population 
Employed 
-0.0313031** 0.265672 -3.0  -0.01381 0.265672 -1.4 
Growth in GDP 
Deflator 
0.000956 17.42619 0.1  0.0007372** 17.42619 0.1 
Muslim Majority -1.398009*** 0 -139.7  -1.02162 0 -102.1 
Oil Exporter -1.411125*** 0 -141.0  -0.42701 0 -42.7 
Landlocked -1.658364*** 0 -165.7  0.040266 0 4.0 
North America 0.646925 0 64.7  - - - 
South America -1.424837** 0 -142.4  0.198766 0 19.9 
Africa 0.527368 0 52.6  -1.48801 0 -148.4 
Middle East 0.8039399** 0 80.3  0.949773 0 94.9 
Asia 1.440359*** 0 144.0  0.430281 0 43.0 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 Performing the sensitivity analysis has shown that with the exception of Case A all of the 
other military variables maintained their significance and in most cases their direction. The 
predictive capabilities of the model can be further examined by looking at the classification 
tables in appendix A & B. in it one can see that using a probability of 0.5 the model correctly 
predicts at least 90% of the cases across the definition of instability. 
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So if all the countries are predicted to not have state failure then we would be correct at 
least 90% of the time. Given the specification and predictive power of the model we can create a 
ranking system for the countries in the dataset that are most likely to have state failure. From the 
table in appendix C the results show that Angola tops the list with a 30% probability of state 
failure. for the second case we find that Armenia has a 47% chance of state failure and internal 
violence, while for the third case we find that Mauritania has an almost 77% chance of state 






This analysis, examined the relationship between the military and political instability for 
115 countries across 17 years. This analysis was unique in how it approached the definition of 
political instability, how it viewed the military and through the use of maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques the relationship between some characteristics of the military and political 
instability were measured. The results showed that all the military variables except percent of the 
population in the military were significant in the first case. However this did not hold when the 
model was expanded to include other variables with previous military rule remaining as the only 
significant variable.  In the second case, conscription, military expenditure percent of population 
in the military previous military rule and religious diversity were significant in explaining the 
onset of state failure and internal war. It also suggested military size was inversely related to 
instability. Once again in the third case conscription, military expenditure, past military regimes, 
ethnic diversity and religious diversity were significant with conscription and religious diversity 
decreasing the likelihood of instability. In the final case the only significant variables were past 
military regimes and military size, with both of these events being shown to have a positive 
relationship. The findings of this study suggested the only military characteristic that was 
significant throughout was past military regime in the country. This suggests that the effects of 
military regimes linger long after the regime has been replaced.
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There are several short comings to be noted in this analysis, one of which lies in ho 
political instability was defined as the onset of very few extreme events. Not only does the focus 
of a few extreme events ignore the wide scope of instability it also limits the number of cases in 
which instability can be measured. Furthermore the study only focused on the occurrence and 
excluded impact. Performing the analysis in this manner excludes the full scope of the effects of 
military characteristics on political instability. Another issue lies in the type of variables used to 
proxy for various military characteristics. For example military expenditure might give us 
insights as to the relationship between current regimes and the military but there may be good 
reason for us to suspect these figures, simply because defense expenditure is a very sensitive 
issue. Some countries might choose not to report their military budget or provide misleading 
information in order to maintain secrecy which could lead to biased estimates in any analysis. 
However the framework presented here may serve as a starting point for other research in this 
field. For example this analysis did not examine the effects of the military on political stability 
when a regime is an autocracy versus when it is a democracy.  Furthermore due to the short time 
period and nature of the data, the analysis was unable to examine if the relationship holds if we 




































Table 6: Classification Table of Estimated Model for Case A with a cut off value of 0.5 
 Classified TRUE FALSE Total 
     
 + 10 2 12 
 - 39 1673 1712 
     
 Total 49 1675 1724 
 Sensitivity Pr( + D) 20.41% 
 Specificity Pr( -~D) 99.88% 
 Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 83.33% 
 Negative predictive value Pr(~D -) 97.72% 
     
 False + rate for true ~D Pr( +~D) 0.12% 
 False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 79.59% 
 False + rate for 
classified 
+ Pr(~D +) 16.67% 
 False - rate for 
classified 
- Pr( D -) 2.28% 
Correctly classified   97.62% 
Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5 
Table 7: Classification Table of Estimated Model for Case B with a cut off value of 0.5 
 Classified TRUE FALSE Total 
     
 + 20 12 32 
 - 94 1598 1692 
     
 Total 114 1610 1724 
 Sensitivity Pr( + D) 17.54% 
 Specificity Pr( -~D) 99.25% 
 Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 62.50% 
 Negative predictive value Pr(~D -) 94.44% 
     
 False + rate for true ~D Pr( +~D) 0.75% 
 False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 82.46% 
 False + rate for 
classified 
+ Pr(~D +) 37.50% 
 False - rate for 
classified 
- Pr( D -) 5.56% 
Correctly classified   93.85% 




Table 8: Classification Table of Estimated model for Case C with a cut off value of 0.5 
 Classified TRUE FALSE Total 
     
 + 47 14 61 
 - 151 1512 1663 
     
 Total 198 1526 1724 
 Sensitivity Pr( + D) 23.74% 
 Specificity Pr( -~D) 99.08% 
 Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 77.05% 
 Negative predictive value Pr(~D -) 90.92% 
     
 False + rate for true ~D Pr( +~D) 0.92% 
 False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 76.26% 
 False + rate for 
classified 
+ Pr(~D +) 22.95% 
 False - rate for classified - Pr( D -) 9.08% 
Correctly classified   90.43% 
Classified as + if predicted probability >=.5 
Table 9: Classification Table of Estimated model for Case D with a cut off value of 0.5 
 Classified TRUE FALSE Total 
     
 + 1 1 2 
 - 23 1260 1283 
     
 Total 24 1261 1285 
 Sensitivity Pr( + D) 4.17% 
 Specificity Pr( -~D) 99.92% 
 Positive predictive value Pr( D +) 50.00% 
 Negative predictive value Pr(~D -) 98.21% 
     
 False + rate for true ~D Pr( +~D) 0.08% 
 False - rate for true D Pr( - D) 95.83% 
 False + rate for 
classified 
+ Pr(~D +) 50.00% 
 False - rate for classified - Pr( D -) 1.79% 
Correctly classified   98.13% 





Table 10: Country Rankings based on model specification  Top 15 for All Cases 
Rank Country Case A Rank Country Case B 
1 Angola 0.3061511 1 Armenia 0.4734353 
2 Congo Kinshasa 0.2869706 2 Angola 0.4508262 
3 Rwanda 0.2031458 3 Algeria 0.4254321 
4 Guinea-Bissau 0.1900324 4 Mauritania 0.3775893 
5 Sierra Leone 0.1802820 5 Mali 0.3738092 
6 Central African 0.1342669 6 Pakistan 0.3697733 
7 Niger 0.1339337 7 Congo Kinshasa 0.3269491 
8 Cote d'Ivoire 0.1316810 8 South Africa 0.2736813 
9 Azerbaijan 0.1195234 9 Laos 0.2734862 
10 Congo-
Brazzaville 
0.1180815 10 Thailand 0.2600241 
11 Myanmar 0.1096003 11 India 0.2434248 
12 Burundi 0.0999467 12 Sudan 0.2338147 
13 Cameroon 0.0970355 13 Myanmar 0.2123209 
14 Liberia 0.0881145 14 Vietnam 0.1923772 
15 Zimbabwe 0.0861781 15 Central African 0.1889096 
 
Table 11: Country Rankings based on model specification 
Rank Country Case C Rank Country Case D 
1 Mauritania 0.778843 1 Myanmar 0.192681 
2 Myanmar 0.713463 2 Sierra Leone 0.171692 
3 India 0.542464 3 Rwanda 0.128263 
4 Sri Lanka 0.476109 4 Zimbabwe 0.110859 
5 Jordan 0.42817 5 Tajikistan 0.099788 
6 Pakistan 0.388896 6 Niger 0.095973 
7 Turkey 0.353041 7 Mauritania 0.093888 
8 Nicaragua 0.334991 8 Egypt 0.082249 
9 Morocco 0.286686 9 Gambia, The 0.062117 
10 Cambodia 0.282814 10 Uganda 0.051525 
11 El Salvador 0.27959 11 Guinea-Bissau 0.04633 
12 Liberia 0.275995 12 Laos 0.044618 
13 Oman 0.262375 13 Azerbaijan 0.043668 
14 Saudi Arabia 0.259978 14 Vietnam 0.041665 
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